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History 
O.C.G.A. § 53·4·4 (amended) 
HB 498 
619 
The Act amends and expands the statutory 
provisions allowing inheritance from their 
fathers by children born out of wedlock. In 
addition to the current provisions allowing 
inheritance when there has been a judicial 
determination of either legitimacy or pater-
nity during the father's lifetime, the inheri-
tance rights of children born out of wed-
lock have been expanded to provide for 
inheritance if, during his lifetime, the 
father either executed and signed a sworn 
statement attesting to the parent-child 
relationship or signed the birth certificate 
of the child. 
July 1, 1987 
Prior to 1980, no statutory provision in Georgia recognized inheritance 
rights in the father's estate for children born out of wedlock.l During the 
1980 session, the General Assembly amended the statutory section cover-
ing inheritance by such children from the mother and maternal relatives.2 
This amendment recognized the inheritance rights of children born out of 
wedlock in the estate of their father and paternal kin, if certain require-
ments had been met.lI 
Prior to the current revision enacted in the 1987 session, statutory law 
provided for inheritance by a child born out of wedlock from his or her 
father only if legitimacy or paternity had been judicially determined dur-
1. Although the Georgia Code still utilizes the term "illegitimate" to designate chil· 
dren born out of wedlock, the latter is a more preferable and accurate description. See. 
e.g., Radford, Georgia Inheritance Rights of Children Born Out of Wedlock, 23 GAo ST. 
B.J. 28, 34 n.1 (1986). 
2. 1980 Ga. Laws 1432 (previously codified at GAo CODE ANN. § 113-904). 
3. This statutory provision became O.C.G.A. § 54-4-4(c) when the Georgia Code was 
recodified in 1982. 
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ing the father's lifetime. Thus, in the 1982 case of Poulos v. McMahan;' 
the Georgia Supreme Court denied the inheritance rights of a child born 
out of wedlock because "there could have been but was not an adjudica-
tion of paternity during the [decedent father's] lifetime."e; 
The court based its holding in Poulos in part on the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Lalli v. Lalli,6 in which the constitutionality of a 
New York statute, similar to the statutory provisions enacted by the 
Georgia Legislature in 1980, was upheld.'1 The New York statuteS re-
quired that, before a child born out of wedlock could inherit from his or 
her father's estate, an order of filiation must have been filed during the 
father's lifetime. Although recognizing that classifications based on 
whether a child was born in or out of wedlock were not subject to "strict 
scrutiny," the Court stressed that such classifications would nevertheless 
be invalid under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment unless they were "substantially related to permissible state inter-
ests."9 The Court found the interests of the state in providing for the just 
and orderly disposition of the property of a decedent to be an "interest of 
considerable magnitude.mo Furthermore, it was an interest «directly im-
plicated in paternal inheritance by illegitimate children because of the 
peculiar problems of proof that are involved."Il 
The New York statute was upheld even though the Court recognized 
that it might operate unfairly against children born out of wedlock who 
were able to present convincing proof of paternity.J2 In a footnote, how-
ever, the Court emphasized that it was not restricting the freedom of any 
state to recognize a proof of paternity by means other than judicial de-
cree: "Thus, a State may prescribe any formal method of proof • • . that 
would assure the authenticity of the acknowledgment."13 
In the 1986 case of Prince v. Black/' the Georgia Supreme Court delin-
eated what is perhaps one of the outer limits of such a "formal method of 
proof" by recognizing a doctrine of "virtual or equitable legitimation." 
The court relied on this doctrine to overturn a Georgia Court of Appeals 
decision15 denying the rights of a son born out of wedlock to inherit from 
4. 250 Ga. 354, 297 S.E.2d 451 (1982). 
5. ld. at 364, 297 S.E.2d at 458. 
6. 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
7. See Cox v. Harris, 486 F. Supp. 219, 221-22 (M.D. Ga. 1980) ("no substantial 
difference between the New York statute and Georgia's own intestacy statute"; Geor-
gia's intestacy statute found "constitutionally fIrm"). 
8. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1981). 
9. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265. 
10. ld. at 268. 
11. ld. 
12. ld. at 272. 
13. ld. at n.8. 
14. 256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986). 
15. Black v. Prince, 176 Ga. App. 465, 336 S.E.2d 318 (1985). 
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his deceased father, even though the appeals court acknowledged that 
sufficient evidence had been presented to permit the jury to find that the 
decedent was the natural father of the child. The court of appeals deci-
sion was based on a finding that no evidence was presented to show that 
the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(c) had been met to enable the 
child to inherit from his father. IS The court therefore reversed the jury 
verdict recognizing the child as a lawful heir. 
In reversing that decision and recognizing the doctrine of "virtual or 
equitable legitimation," the supreme court relied on the "clear and con-
vincing" evidence which the appellant had presented to establish that the 
decedent was his natural father. I? The court compared the doctrine of 
virtual or equitable legitimation to the previously recognized theory of 
virtual or equitable adoption. Under this latter theory, foster children 
have been allowed to inherit from foster parents who died intestate if the 
foster parents had made an agreement to adopt prior to their deaths.ls 
Similarly, the court pointed out: 
There may be cases in which there is such clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the child is the natural child of the father 
and that the father intended for the child to share in his intes-
tate estate, in the same manner that the child would have 
shared if he had been formally legitimated, that equity will 
consider that done which ought to have been done •..• Thus 
the father's intentions will be fulfilled by allowing the child to 
inherit the property that was undisposed of by will as if the 
child was legitimate, although the child was not formally legiti-
mated and cannot be considered legitimate in the eyes of the 
law .... Just as the doctrine of virtual or equitable adoption 
will allow a child to inherit from his intestate foster parents 
under certain conditions, the doctrine of virtual or equitable 
legitimation will allow an illegitimate child to inherit from his 
intestate father's estate when the evidence is clear and con-
vincing as it was in this case.19 
16. Id. at 466, 336 S.E.2d at 320. 
17. Prince, 256 Ga. at 80·81, 344 S.E.2d at 413. In remanding Coplin v. Broadnax, 
256 Ga. 291, 349 S.E.2d 748 (1986) for a factual determination of whether plaintiff had 
met the standard for virtual or equitable legitimation, the court reiterated its holding 
in Prince: 
There we held that a child born out of wedlock may share in his natural 
father's estate, as an heir·at·law, in the same manner as children born of 
wedlock, provided that there is clear and convincing evidence that the 
child is the natural child of the father, and that the father intended for 
the child to share in his estate. 
Coplin, 256 Ga. at 291; 349 S.E.2d at 748. 
18. Prince, 256 Ga. at 80, 344 S.E.2d at 412. 
19. Id. at 80·81,344 S.E.2d at 412-13. 
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This holding not only expanded the rights of children born out of wed-
lock to inherit from their fathers quite beyond the statutory provisions 
then in effect, but also beyond those included in HB 498. 
HB498 
The Act expands the cuuant provisions of subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 
53-4-4 by adding two new conditions under which children born out of 
wedlock may inherit from their father. In addition to the previous provi-
sions allowing inheritance when there had been a judicial determination 
of either legitimacy or paternity during the father's lifetime, inheritance 
also will be allowed when the father has either executed and signed a 
sworn statement attesting to the parent-child relationship or signed the 
birth certificate of the child. 
These standards greatly diminish both the father's and the child's bur-
den to establish inheritance rights. The Act should significantly benefit 
people who are either reluctant to become involved in the judicial system 
or who are unable to afford the legal fees and costs of having paternity or 
legitimacy legally determined and declared.20 The Act also will eliminate 
situations such as the one which arose in the Fulton County Probate 
Court involving a German family. In that situation, the father had signed 
an affidavit in Germany attesting to his paternity but neither paternity 
nor legitimacy had been judicially declared during his lifetime. Signing 
such an affidavit was sufficient under German law to allow a child born 
out of wedlock to share in the paternal estate, but was not sufficient to 
comply with the Georgia statutory inheritance requirements.21 HB 498 
should alleviate such anomalies. 
Providing a less burdensome means of meeting the statutory require-
ments for inheritance by children born out of wedlock should obviate 
somewhat the "harsh result" under prior Georgia law of "punishing a 
child born out of wedlock merely because the child or the child's parents 
were ignorant of the requisite legal procedures for establishing paternity 
or reluctant to pursue in court the adjudication of a relationship which, as 
far as they were concerned, was obvious. "22 This statutory provision, in 
conjunction with the judicial recognition of the doctrine of virtual or eq-
uitable legitimation, contributes to the significant expansion of inheri-
tance rights of the more than 20,000 children born out of wedlock in 
Georgia each year.23 
J. Watson 
20. See Radford, supra note I, at 33. 
21. Telephone interview with Judge Floyd E. Propst, Fulton County Probate Court 
(Mar. 18, 1987). Under German law a child born out of wedlock does not inherit from 
the father; ipstead, the child receives a child's share as a creditor. ld. 
22. Radford, supra note I, at 34. 
23. ld. at 28. 
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